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Using sheep psychology to guide sheep policy
Commentary on Marino & Merskin on Sheep Complexity
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Abstract: Marino & Merskin’s valuable review of the literature on sheep cognition shows how
entrenched common views of these animals’ mental lives are disputed by the research literature.
Yet the evidence they muster faces three challenges that their target article does not discuss: (1)
the behavioral tasks are strongly anthropocentric; (2) neuroscientific data are absent; and (3)
applications are not discussed. I touch on all three of these here.
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1. Understanding sheep through the lens of human psychology. Marino & Merskin (2019)
(M&M) conclude that sheep minds are considerably more complex and sophisticated than
commonly and historically thought, but it remains a little unclear how to interpret the data they
review. I think the data surely underestimate the intelligence of sheep (a feeling shared by some
of the other commentators, and for similar reasons; Brooks Pribac 2019, Pena-Guzman 2019).
The reason is that essentially all of the tasks, and the corresponding psychological processes
they are supposed to measure, have been invented by psychologists familiar with human rather
than sheep psychology. There are at least three problems with this.
First, these tasks and processes are historically entrenched. It is likely that they will, in
time, be superseded by processes better aligned with computational models and/or
neuroscience data.
Second, they are thought up by human minds. Unless these humans are seasoned
ethologists, it is likely that the entire psychological ontology, the corresponding inventory of
tasks, and the interpretations of the data from sheep are all strongly anthropomorphic. (Vonk
2019 voices similar concerns in her commentary.)
Third, the tasks are highly artificial and fail to consider the actual natural behaviors and
ecological niche of the sheep. I find it doubtful that cognitive inhibition, flexibility, planning, etc.
(to pick just the first ones mentioned in M&M’s paper) are the best way to carve up the terrain.
One could think of alternative ontologies. When more data-driven approaches to executive
functions have actually been taken (in humans), processes don’t exactly cluster according to the
preconceived categories that psychologists have thought up (see Eisenberg et al. 2018 for an
example).
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2. A place for neuroscience. Some of the other processes reviewed by M&M are perhaps less
problematic in their ecological validity than what I noted above. Face perception, for example,
clearly shows abilities that make some ecological sense. It is here that neuroscience data could
also be mustered: it not only helps bridge the performance-competence gap, but insofar as it
shows close similarities with human brain responses, it is an independent source of evidence for
the mental lives of sheep. For example, there is the finding that cells in sheep brains in regions
involved in face processing respond to the size of the horns on sheep, a signal for social
dominance. In fact, sheep brains respond to faces in a way that is similar in many respects to
how primate brains respond to faces: neurons encode face identity, familiarity, and social
information (see Tate et al. 2006 for review). Noninvasive brain imaging (functional MRI) has
been applied to dogs (Cook et al. 2018), adding to our knowledge of the minds of those animals;
there is no reason similar data could not be acquired in sheep.
We understand perhaps the least about sheep emotions, as it is unclear how even to
measure these, but it seems apparent that the way we currently infer them is strongly
anthropomorphic. I for one have no doubt that sheep have emotions, but we need much better
behavioral criteria to figure out which emotions these are (Adolphs 2017). Both emotion and
personality are strong components of social behavior (indeed, M&M already have social
behavior categories under their “emotion” section), and a better understanding of these
psychological domains will come from a better observation of real-world social behavior
together with neuroscience data.
3. What do we do next? Notwithstanding the above limitations, a relatively persuasive picture
does emerge from the literature review that M&M provide. Sheep have minds of considerable
sophistication. At a minimum, it seems fair to say that they are so complex that we currently do
not understand them well at all. At a maximum, we may need to consider their mental
complexity on a par with our own, once we do understand them well enough. What follows
from this?
Given the above picture, the risk-averse stance would be to allow sheep some of the
rights of persons until proven otherwise (such as the habeas corpus cases that have been won in
recent years, mostly for great apes; The Economist 2018). Going further requires more specific
arguments. In her commentary, Vonk (2019) expresses the widely shared view that the capacity
for suffering is the most important criterion. It would hence follow that scientific evidence
bearing on this question is most relevant (emotions, personalities, etc.); but one could imagine
arguments based on other capacities as well. (As in humans, the capacity for complex
psychological lives, even if only positive, surely has intrinsic value.) Woodruff (2019) is perhaps
the most specific in his commentary, arguing for particular changes in policy. Like the legal
arguments, these will need to be linked to specific types of scientific evidence.
The biggest challenge, then, is perhaps not just gathering more and better data on sheep
psychology, but some sort of guiding inventory of the kinds of evidence worth looking for, in the
sense that they are what we need if we actually want to do anything about the welfare of
sheep.
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